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Summary: Dagens Nyheter reports that a police officer, during an active gang conflict, worked as an instructor at a shooting range in his free time and that people from violent gang environments appeared on the customer list. DN also reports that police leadership was alerted but that the officer was not stopped. According to the newspaper, the range has appeared in at least 30 murder and weapons investigations since 2010 through suspects linked to the site in different ways.
This is not a conviction and not a claim that the officer personally trained anyone for a specific crime. It is an investigation of the risk environment: what happens when a police officer with professional knowledge of weapons, tactics, and policing also becomes an instructor in a setting where people from serious criminal networks move?
What DN reports
DN’s investigation describes a shooting range where people linked to several of the most violent gangs allegedly trained. The article states that a police officer worked there as an instructor in his free time, that police leadership was alerted, and that the activity nevertheless continued.
The important point is not only the side job. DN describes a weapons-training environment that, according to the newspaper, appears in many murder and weapons investigations. If those details are correct, the question is not only what the instructor knew, but why internal controls did not react more forcefully earlier.
What cannot be stated here?
- DN’s article alone does not establish that the instructor intentionally trained people for future crimes.
- It also does not establish that every person on a customer list committed crimes or that every connection to the range was unlawful.
- What can be scrutinised is whether internal police risk assessment was sufficient once warning signs existed.
Why is this a rule-of-law issue?
Police officers have access to knowledge civilians generally do not have: how weapons are used, how interventions unfold, how investigations are built, and which methods may avoid detection. When that competence moves close to serious criminal environments, a specific trust risk arises, even if individual shooting-range sessions can be lawful.
The question is therefore not only whether a formal rule was broken. The question is whether the state can identify risks when officers’ side jobs, private contacts, and commercial weapons environments overlap with organised crime.
The same pattern as in other investigations
This article belongs with our investigation of the Gotland affair and Peter Rätz. There the question is how close the state may come to the crime it is supposed to fight. Here the question is how close police knowledge and networks may come to environments where violent capacity is built.
It also belongs with the investigation of Palantir and police analytics. In both cases the core issue is control: who sees what police do, who stops risks in time, and how can the public know that power is not drifting?
What should be asked now?
- What rules apply to police officers’ side jobs in weapons and security environments?
- When did police leadership receive information about the range’s customer base and links?
- What risk assessments were documented, and who was responsible for not stopping the setup?
- How is it checked that private police competence does not strengthen criminal networks’ violent capacity?
Why does this belong on the statistics page?
Individual revelations do not say everything, but they show what statistics often hide: how risks appear before a formal decision, before a JO complaint, and before an internal investigation. Read this investigation together with our statistics page, where patterns and case material collect broader signals about oversight, police, and state control.
